摘要:Mainly considering the premium and penalty mechanism of reverse supply chain under manufacturers ’ competition environment, using game theory, we build 5 models, which are centralized decision-making of reverse supply chain , the total profits decision-making based on the profits of reverse supply chain and the manu-facturer who does not collect waste products , decentralized decision-making with no premium and penalty mecha-nism, government ’ s premium and penalty mechanisms for the manufacturers and recyclers of reverse supply chain.The study presents several conclusions .Competition is beneficial to raising collection rate and the more intense the competition , the higher the collection rate;the retail price of new products offered by manufacturers actively recycling is lower , which brings about price-competitive advantage .The fourth and fifth scenarios play a part in increasing collection rate , and the greater premium and penalty , the higher collection rate , the lower retail price of new products .It is more efficient for the government to offer them premium mechanism rather than the premium and penalty mechanism , sine the former is valid for increasing both the manufacturer and the collec-tor’ s enthusiasm .The buyback price of the fourth scenario is higher than that of the fifth scenario .With premi-um and penalty mechanism the profit of manufacturer who collects waste products is higher than that of manufac -turer who does not collect waste products .The profit of manufacturer , who does not collect waste products , decreases with the increase of the degree of premium and penalty .%主要運用博弈論方法探討制造商競爭環境下的逆向供應鏈獎懲機制,建立了5個決策模型,分別是逆向供應鏈集中式決策、以逆向供應鏈和不回收再制造的制造商的總利潤為目標決策、逆向供應鏈分散式決策、政府對制造商實施獎懲機制以及政府對回收商實施獎懲機制下逆向供應鏈的決策模型。研究表明:競爭對回收率提高有益,競爭越激烈回收率越高;積極回收再制造的制造商的新產品零售價較低,具有價格競爭優勢;獎懲制造商和獎懲回收商均能起到提高回收率的作用,獎懲力度越大,回收率越高,新產品零售價越低;獎懲制造商比獎懲回收商更能調動制造商和回收商的積極性;獎懲制造商時的回購價高于獎懲回收商時的回購價;在實施獎懲機制時,回收再制造的制造商利潤高于不回收再制造的制造商的利潤;不回收再制造的制造商的利潤隨獎懲力度的增大而降低。